Dubai Star Oil Spill
October 30-31, 2009

AFTER ACTION REPORT
/IMPROVEMENT PLAN

FINAL REPORT
February 5, 2010
ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is the City and County of San Francisco Dubai Star Oil Spill After Action Report / Improvement Plan (AAR/IP).

2. At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis and, when unattended, will be stored in a locked container or area offering sufficient protection against theft, compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the morning of October 30, 2009, the tanker Dubai Star released approximately 400-800 gallons of fuel oil into the San Francisco Bay during a fueling operation. The City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) departments and agencies mobilized to support the response and recovery efforts following the spill.

The purpose of this After Action Report (AAR) is to analyze the City’s response efforts, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

This report was developed using a capabilities and performance-based approach, organized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Target Capabilities List (TCL). The TCL supports the National Preparedness Goal by defining the capabilities needed to achieve national preparedness for major all-hazards events. In addition, the TCL defines and provides the basis for assessing preparedness. The Dubai Star Oil Spill primarily tested the following capabilities:

- Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Emergency Public Information and Warning

This report will provide a synopsis of the incident and will examine the City’s response, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement. The major strengths identified during the response are as follows:

- Inter-departmental coordination was excellent.
- Notification of the incident was prompt.
- Departments were well-prepared to assist with incident response.
- The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) coordinated well with the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) Coastal Region throughout the event.

Throughout the response, several opportunities for improvement in the City’s ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary areas for improvement are as follows:

- Training is needed on the roles and responsibilities of the Local Agency Representative position and the Local Government On-Scene Coordinator (LGOSC) position within the Incident Command Post (ICP).
- Departmental contact information in the EOC should be updated.
- Prior to EOC deactivation, ensure that all outstanding responsibilities have been assigned to an appropriate department and documented, to include the deactivation of remaining resources.

The City’s overall response to the Dubai Star Oil Spill was proactive and effective. The actions taken were appropriate and demonstrated the capability to coordinate issues and work together. Successful response strategies were developed to address protection of the waterfront and...
supporting Unified Command operations. The high level of commitment and inter-agency cooperation exhibited by involved departments is a result of the increased level of joint training, participation in planning meetings, and exercises conducted in the last few years. As with any response, capabilities were tested and areas for improvement were identified. Lessons learned will be addressed through the identification and implementation of corrective actions.
SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

INCIDENT DETAILS

Incident Name
Dubai Star Oil Spill

Date and Time
October 30, 2009 at 6:48 a.m. PDT

CCSF Response Duration
October 30 - 31, 2009

Location
The spill occurred during a bunkering (fueling) operation at Anchorage Nine from the tanker Dubai Star.

Mission Areas
Response and Recovery

Capabilities
- Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Emergency Public Information and Warning

CCSF RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

Departments and Agencies
- 311 Customer Service Center
- City Attorney
- Department of Emergency Management, Division of Emergency Communications
- Department of Emergency Management, Division of Emergency Services/Emergency Medical Services
- Department of Human Resources
- Department of the Environment
- Department of Public Health
INCIDENT SUMMARY

Early on the morning of October 30, 2009, the Panamanian-flagged vessel Dubai Star and a fuel barge were conducting bunkering operations at Anchorage Nine in San Francisco Bay when it released approximately 400-800 gallons of fuel oil into the San Francisco Bay. The spill was initially reported to the Coast Guard at 6:48 a.m., who immediately dispatched a small boat from the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Station San Francisco to evaluate the incident. Pollution investigators from USCG Sector San Francisco were also dispatched to the scene to investigate and assist with oil spill recovery.

Initial reports were provided by the ship and relayed by the State Warning Center, stating that five gallons of crude bunker fuel had been released. The USCG confirmed a sheen of 1 to 1.5 miles to the stern of the vessel. The San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (DEM) Duty Officer received notification of the event at 8:12 a.m. and then released an initial situation briefing to San Francisco departments via CCSF Alert. Soon after the initial situation briefing, further information was received about the spill indicating that it was larger than originally reported.

The Incident Command Post (ICP) was established at approximately 9:00 a.m. on Coast Guard Island in Alameda. As set forth in the U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Francisco 2009 Area Contingency Plan (ACP), USCG, the Department of Fish and Game, and Dubai Star’s contractor, the O’Brien’s Group, were jointly in command of the incident, with the option of including the Local Government On-Scene Coordinator (LGOSC) position within Unified Command. Shortly after activation of the ICP, California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (CDFG-OSPR) contacted San Francisco to request a representative to fill the LGOSC role in Unified Command. Consequently, at 9:45 a.m. a DEM representative was sent to the ICP to fill this role. However, as the spill progressed and it became evident that Alameda County would be most affected, the LGOSC position was eventually transitioned to an Alameda County representative.
At 12:30 p.m., DEM made notification to all relevant departments that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would be activated to a ‘partial’ status. From October 30 to October 31, representatives from 311, the City Attorney’s Office, DEM, Department of Human Resources, Department of the Environment, Department of Public Health, Department of Public Works, General Services Agency, the Mayor’s Office, Public Utilities Commission, Fire Department, Police Department, Port of San Francisco, and Treasure Island Development Authority diligently supported EOC efforts to coordinate oil spill activities.

The primary areas at risk during the spill were the Oakland Inner and Outer Harbor, the town of Alameda, Treasure Island, and Yerba Buena Island, with San Francisco Piers 92 to 96 and 96 to Candlestick potentially at risk. The San Francisco EOC supported activities to post “No Swimming” signs on at-risk shorelines and to conduct booming operations around Clipper Cove on Treasure Island.

By the evening of October 31, the need for San Francisco citywide coordination had diminished. At 6:00 p.m. that evening, the San Francisco EOC officially deactivated, though some San Francisco departments continued follow-up operations until Monday, November 2. The ICP remained active until all residual tasks associated with oil spill cleanup efforts were fulfilled in mid-November.

INCIDENT TIMELINE

October 30, 2009

- 6:48 a.m. – U.S. Coast Guard notified of spill
- 7:40 a.m. – California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) notified of spill
- 8:12 a.m.– DEM Duty Officer notified of spill
- 8:45 a.m.– Initial Situation Briefing issued via CCSF Alert to CCSF Alert email group
- 9:00 a.m. – (Approx) ICP established at the U.S. Coast Guard Island in Alameda
- 9:30 a.m. – (Approx) CDFG-OSPR representative contacts DEM to request a San Francisco representative to fill LGOSC position
- 9:45 a.m. – San Francisco representative sent to ICP
- 10:00 a.m. – San Francisco departmental conference call
- 10:30 a.m. – San Francisco representatives from DEM and San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) arrive at ICP
- 11:00 a.m. – California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) Coastal Regional conducts regional conference call
- 12:00 p.m.? – Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) activated
- 12:30 p.m. – Mayor’s Press Conference
- 12:30 p.m. – San Francisco EOC partially activated
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- 12:50 p.m. – Oiled Wildlife Care Network (OWCN) activated
- 12:50 p.m. – Volunteer hotline established by CDFG
- 12:55 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 1:00 – 2:30 p.m. – Staff arrives at EOC
- 1:45 p.m. – SFFD (Division 3) representative arrives at ICP
- 2:10 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 2:30 p.m. – CalEMA regional conference call
- 2:41 p.m. – Briefing with the San Francisco Department of Human Resources (DHR) to discuss strategies to address potential volunteer interest
- 2:45 p.m. – Alameda County established as Local Government On-Scene Coordinator (LGOSC) in UC
- 3:00 p.m. – Update received from San Francisco representative in ICP
- 3:45 p.m. – 10’x30’ sheen one mile south of Yerba Buena Island; 2,500 feet of boom deployed by ICP; Clipper Cove on Treasure Island potentially to be boomed
- 3:50 p.m. – Coordination of posting “No Swimming” signs around Treasure Island begins
- 4:00 p.m. – CalEMA regional conference call
- 4:15 p.m. – Coordination begins with DHR to determine a method to capture interested volunteers (though no actual volunteer opportunities yet)
- 4:30 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 4:45 p.m. – Director of CDFG officially closes fisheries along the East Bay from the Bay Bridge to the San Mateo Bridge
- 5:00 p.m. – EOC issues Policy Briefing to Policy Group
- 5:30 p.m. – Volunteer opportunity posted on SF Volunteer Center website to capture any interested parties
- 6:00 p.m. – San Francisco issues press release
- 6:15 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 7:15 p.m. – The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) begins to post ‘No Swimming’ signs on Treasure Island
- 7:30 p.m. – End of Unified Command operational period
- 8:00 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 8:30 p.m. – ICP conference call
  - 400-800 gallon spill estimate
  - 50% on-water recovery
  - No landfall yet
  - ICP to boom Clipper Cove on the following morning (10/31)
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- 9:00 p.m. – San Francisco decision to boom Clipper Cove with local resources
- 9:00 p.m. – San Francisco EOC Volunteer Recruitment and Management Plan finalized
- 9:30 p.m. – EOC Action Plan completed
- 9:30 p.m. – 1200 a.m. – San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) Marine Unit in coordination with SFFD deploys 2,100 ft of Port-owned rigid boom at Clipper Cove

October 31, 2009
- 12:00 a.m. – End of San Francisco EOC operational period
- 6:00 a.m. – Beginning of Unified Command operational period
- 7:00 a.m. – Beginning of San Francisco EOC operational period
- 7:30 a.m. – Receive initial reports from San Francisco ICP representative
- 9:00 a.m. – ICP conference call
  - All threatened environmentally sensitive sites boomed
  - Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Teams (SCAT) looking for oiled wildlife
  - 5,213 gallons of oily wastewater recovered
- 9:00 a.m. – PUC posts ‘No Swimming’ signs along mainland; Port of San Francisco posts ‘No Swimming/No Fishing’ signs on Port property
- 9:15 a.m. – SFPD requests floating strobe lights for Treasure Island boom
- 10:00 a.m. – EOC issues Policy Briefing to Policy Group
- 10:00 a.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 10:00 a.m. – DEM Director, DEM Deputy Director, and SFFD Deputy Chief survey the spill via Marin 1 of the SFPD
- 10:30 a.m. – Ferry service briefly halted by USCG; restored very quickly
- 10:45 a.m. – BayKeepers contacted to assist with shoreline monitoring; Port designated as point-of-contact
- 11:00 a.m. – CalEMA regional conference call
  - Report of sheen at Ballena Isle Marina
  - No overflight scheduled until fog clears
- 11:02 a.m. – ICP booming from Piers 92 to 96 and from 96 to Candlestick
- 12:18 p.m. – Helpbayarea.org reformatted to accept volunteers for spill
- 12:39 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 1:30 p.m. – Purchase Order completed for 11 floating strobe lights and 21 batteries
- 3:00 p.m. – ICP conducts flyover; no sheen on west side of bay, small migration of oil near Treasure Island/Yerba Buena Island approximately 400 yards long
- 4:00 p.m. – CalEMA regional conference call
  - ICP developing demobilization plan
Only Robert Crown Beach oiled (10-12 birds affected)
- Ballena Isle Marina boomed
- Boom to remain at Treasure Island/Yerba Buena Island until Monday morning (11/2)

- 4:00 p.m. – “No Swimming” signs to be removed from coastal beach areas, TI/YBI, and from Aquatic Park to Candlestick Park upon normal water testing results by PUC and Port on Monday morning (11/2)
- 5:00 p.m. – Local representatives released from ICP
- 5:41 p.m. – Situation Briefing issued to CCSF Alert email group
- 6:00 p.m. – San Francisco EOC deactivates; EOC moves to standby mode
- 6:30 p.m. – SFPD Marine Unit sets up strobe lights on Clipper Cove boom
- 7:00 p.m. – End of ICP operational period

November 2, 2009
- 10:00 a.m. – PUC receives instruction to remove ‘No Swimming’ signs
- 2:00 p.m. – SFPD Marine Unit in coordination with SFFD removes boom from Clipper Cove
SECTION 2: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

This section of the report reviews the performance of the capabilities, activities, and tasks associated with the City and County of San Francisco’s (CCSF’s) response efforts to the Dubai Star Oil Spill. In this section, observations are organized by capability and associated activities. Capabilities linked to the response are listed, followed by corresponding activities. Each activity is followed by related observations, which include analyses and recommendations.

CAPABILITY: Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination

Capability Summary: The Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability provides necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities. Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination is the multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and tribal layers of government, the private sector, and citizens. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and preferably declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers who need it. More simply, the goal is to get the right information to the right people at the right time.

An effective intelligence/information sharing and dissemination system will provide durable, reliable, and effective information exchanges (both horizontally and vertically) between those responsible for gathering information and the analysts and consumers of threat-related information. It will also allow for feedback and other necessary communications in addition to the regular flow of information and intelligence.

Throughout the Dubai Star Oil Spill, San Francisco maintained consistent communication with regional counterparts through periodic regional conference calls and with the Incident Command Post through the San Francisco Local Agency Representative on Coast Guard Island. Doing so enabled the San Francisco Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Policy Group to maintain an overall picture of the event during all stages of response and recovery.

Capability Definition Outcome: Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector entities to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, and response to a threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency.
Activity 1: Vertically Flow Information

Observation 1.1: (Area for Improvement) Early in the response, representatives from the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (DEM) and the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) were sent to Coast Guard Island. The DEM representative was sent at the request of Unified Command representatives to fill the Unified Command Local Government On-Scene Coordinator (LGOSC) position. However, shortly after arriving and receiving a briefing, Unified Command requested that a representative from Alameda assume the LGOSC position. This transition was made, and the San Francisco representative was moved to the position of San Francisco Local Agency Representative in the Incident Command Post (ICP).

Once in this position, the San Francisco Local Agency Representative was initially unsure who their point-of-contact was, as well as their roles and responsibilities. After these initial issues were resolved, the Agency Representative communicated frequently with the San Francisco EOC to inform of any updates with the response. However, the Agency Representative found it difficult from time to time to get accurate information from the ICP, which in turn caused miscommunication with the San Francisco EOC.

Reference(s):
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Target Capabilities List (TCL). Critical Task: ComG 4.1.1; Disseminate relevant intelligence and/or information from Federal or State entities to local authorities in a usable format and in a timely manner.
3. San Francisco 2009 Area Contingency Plan

Analysis: San Francisco responded quickly and efficiently when requested by Unified Command to provide an LGOSC. However, the individual selected to fill the position was unfamiliar with the LGOSC position, which caused general confusion about their roles and responsibilities within Unified Command. The decision to transition the position from San Francisco to Alameda and the ensuing assumption of the San Francisco Agency Representative position caused further confusion for the individual and initially was a hindrance in San Francisco’s ability to obtain timely and accurate information from the ICP.

Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):
1. Selection of the LGOSC position must be a clearly defined process. Once established, the individual/county selected as LGOSC should maintain consistency throughout the operational period to avoid confusion.
a. **Recommendation:** Through coordination with the region, ensure that the LGOSC position has clearly defined procedures, to include initial selection and transitioning of responsibilities.

2. More individuals within San Francisco must be familiarized with the roles and responsibilities of oil spill response positions in Unified Command and at the ICP.
   a. **Recommendation:** Provide training to numerous San Francisco departments to familiarize them with the roles and responsibilities associated with the LGOSC position and the San Francisco Local Agency Representative position.
   b. **Recommendation:** Provide the required LGOSC training, as defined in the *U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Francisco 2009 Area Contingency Plan (ACP)*, to multiple San Francisco representatives.
   c. **Recommendation:** Develop a protocol for the Agency Representative position that outlines the roles and responsibilities of individuals assuming this position.

**Observation 1.2: (Strength)** The San Francisco EOC participated in frequent California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) Coastal Region conference calls.

**Reference(s):**

**Analysis:** The CalEMA Coastal Region Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) hosted consistent conference calls throughout the initial days of oil spill response and recovery operations. Participation in these calls was extremely beneficial to San Francisco, as it provided a medium in which to learn of issues and needs throughout other jurisdictions in the region. The ability to maintain a regional perspective during the event was extremely beneficial in San Francisco’s overall understanding of the event.

**Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):**
1. Regional conference calls were a useful and effective tool for regional communication.
   a. **Recommendation:** None.
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SECTION 2: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

CAPABILITY: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Capability Summary: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life, property, safety, and security.

The San Francisco EOC assisted in the coordination of posting “No Swimming” signs and in the deployment of boom at Clipper Cove on Treasure Island. Overall, coordination efforts went very well. Departments and their designated staff were well prepared to address the needs of an oil spill event, and worked together seamlessly.

Capability Definition Outcome: Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Activity 1: Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Operations

Observation 1.1: (Strength and Area for Improvement) Upon notification that the waters surrounding Treasure Island / Yerba Buena Island and Piers 92 to 96 and 96 to Candlestick were potentially at risk of oil contamination, coordination to post “No Swimming” signs occurred instantaneously. The Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA), the Port of San Francisco, the Department of Public Works (DPW) and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) worked well together from October 30–November 2 to both post and remove “No Swimming” signs.

Reference(s):
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Target Capabilities List (TCL). Critical Task: Res.B1c 3.5; Provide logistical support for the operation and requests of the IC/EOC.

Analysis: The coordination that occurred between TIDA, the Port of San Francisco, DPW, and PUC for the posting of “No Swimming” signs was excellent. PUC was well prepared with needed supplies at the ready. TIDA noted, however, that it would be beneficial to have a cache of signage located on Treasure Island. Furthermore, the Port of San Francisco noted that
utilization of their sign-posting strategy from the 2007 Cosco Busan Oil Spill would have been advantageous during coordination efforts. While sign posting operations went well, directions for sign removal operations after the deactivation of the EOC were unclear. Although decisions had been made in the EOC regarding the demobilization of the signs, these decisions were not documented. This led to uncertainty of exactly when to remove signs, or who should be contacted for sign removal.

**Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):**

1. It would be helpful to have a cache of beach, swimming, and/or fishing closure signage located on Treasure Island for easy access.
   a. **Recommendation:** Stock Treasure Island with a cache of beach, swimming, and/or fishing closure signage.

2. The Port of San Francisco’s sign posting strategy from the 2007 Cosco Busan Oil Spill would have been helpful in the Dubai Star incident.
   a. **Recommendation:** Plans and procedures developed during previous similar incidents should be captured and easily accessible for future use.
   b. **Recommendation:** Ensure that departments/agencies who own beach, swimming, or fishing closure signs have a sign deployment plan.

3. Although the EOC was deactivated, there must be sufficient follow-up on all remaining tasks and deactivation of resources, with a designated point of contact for each. Decisions made in the EOC about sign removal should have been documented and forwarded to applicable departments to ensure that this activity occurred.
   a. **Recommendation:** When the EOC is deactivated, ensure that all outstanding responsibilities have been assigned to an appropriate department, to include the deactivation of remaining resources.

**Observation 1.2: (Strength and Area for Improvement)** The San Francisco EOC successfully coordinated the deployment and maintenance of 2,100 feet of Port-owned rigid boom at Clipper Cove.

**Reference(s):**

**Analysis:** At approximately 8:30 p.m. on October 30, one hour after the close of the ICP operational period, the San Francisco EOC received notification from the San Francisco Agency Representative at the ICP that Clipper Cove had not been boomed. This was contrary to a report received earlier that the ICP would coordinate deployment of boom at Clipper Cove that day to protect it from projected overnight landfall in the area.

Based on policy direction, the EOC requested that Clipper Cove be boomed. After a safety and feasibility analysis, SFFD and the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) determined that the operation could safely be conducted. Following this decision, the EOC coordinated with SFFD and the SFPD Marine Unit to deploy 2,100 feet of Port-owned rigid boom at Clipper Cove between 9:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. that evening.

Clipper Cove is not an identified sensitive site in the ACP, and therefore has no pre-designated booming strategy. While this was not a great hindrance to the deployment of the boom at Clipper Cove, it was noted that pre-identifying booming strategies for areas not included in the ACP would be beneficial for future oil spill operations.

**Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):**

1. Information relayed from the ICP to the EOC must be verified for accuracy prior to release.
   a. **Recommendation:** Develop a protocol for the Agency Representative position that includes a procedure to verify information received at the ICP before distribution.

2. Decisions regarding the safety and feasibility of a tactical operation are made by the appropriate departments/agencies based on department safety protocols.
   a. **Recommendation:** None.

3. Pre-determined site booming options for non-ACP sites (such as economic sites) would be helpful in the event that San Francisco is interested in protecting areas that are not identified in the ACP.
   a. **Recommendation:** Develop site booming strategies for non-ACP sites in San Francisco.
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CAPABILITY: Emergency Operations Center Management

Capability Summary: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes: EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

Initial notification of the Dubai Star spill was received by the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (DEM) Duty Officer on the morning of October 30, 2009. Throughout the duration of the event, communications between CCSF departments was primarily achieved through CCSF Alert, conference calls, and personal phone calls. Notification and early incident information was communicated well among departments during the ramp-up to EOC activation, and remained consistent throughout all EOC operational periods.

The San Francisco EOC was activated from 12:30 p.m. Friday, October 30 until 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 31, 2009. Upon activation, personnel requested from specific City departments reported to the EOC. Activation of the EOC was beneficial to the coordination and communication of the event by providing a single collection point for information flowing into and out of the EOC.

Capability Definition Outcome: The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-planned or no-notice event.

Activity 1: Direct Emergency Operation Center’s Tactical Operations

Observation 1.1: (Strength) The EOC was staffed quickly and with the appropriate department representatives to fill the following Emergency Support Functions (ESF):

- ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
- ESF #4: Firefighting
- ESF #5: Emergency Management
- ESF #7: Logistics
- ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
- ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
- ESF #13: Law Enforcement
Reference(s):

**Analysis:** Upon activation, the EOC identified the ESFs and the corresponding EOC sections and branches that would be activated. The EOC was staffed by appropriate personnel from multiple departments. The response to EOC assignments was extremely positive among all involved departments, and consequently the EOC worked very well as a unit.

**Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):**
1. San Francisco departments work very well together in an EOC setting, as a result of multiple training and exercise efforts over the past several years.
   a. **Recommendation:** Utilize future EOC activations as an opportunity for additional staff to shadow operations.

**Activity 2: Activate EOC**

**Observation 2.1: (Area for Improvement)** Upon the determination that EOC activation was needed, activation details were relayed via CCSF Alert to relevant departments. However, not all departments received notification, while other departments received redundant notification among multiple employees. Some departments responded to the email notification with questions, but received no reply.

**Reference(s):**

**Analysis:** Although notification of the EOC activation was prompt and informative, it is important that the pre-populated address book utilized to submit notification is comprehensive in order to ensure that all relevant departments receive the information. Furthermore, it would be useful to include in the notification message clear directions on how the notifying party may be contacted. Typically in the initial stages of an event, the duty officer pager would be the designated contact number. Once the EOC is fully activated, it would be helpful to include EOC branch phone numbers on subsequent situation reports.

Redundant receipt of information within a department is not problematic, although departments without a designated EOC reporting procedure found this redundancy to be confusing. Some were unsure whether an individual’s receipt of the notification meant that they were responsible for reporting to the EOC or whether it was simply an informational notification.
Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):

1. EOC activation information must be communicated to all relevant departments in a timely manner.
   a. **Recommendation:** Review CCSF Alert contacts and ensure that all relevant departments are included with correct contact information.

2. Contact information for the notifying party should be clearly stated within the notification message to ensure that departments know who to contact with questions.
   a. **Recommendation:** When sending EOC activation notification or EOC situation status reports, ensure that appropriate contact information is included.

3. If not already established, departments should develop a designated EOC reporting procedure.
   a. **Recommendation:** Each department should consider developing a protocol that identifies staff members (three deep) required to report to the EOC upon initial activation.

Activity 3: Gather and Provide Information

Observation 3.1: (Strength and Area for Improvement) The initial notification of the Dubai Star Oil Spill was received by the DEM Duty Officer at 8:12 a.m. The Duty Officer immediately submitted an initial situation briefing to San Francisco departments via CCSF Alert. At 10:00 a.m., DEM convened a conference call with appropriate departments to relay further information about the spill and its potential effects on San Francisco. Inter-department conference calls led by DEM continued throughout the response.

Reference(s):


Analysis: CCSF successfully communicated known information of the oil spill to relevant departments and began inter-departmental coordination strategies during the early stages of the incident. However, it was noted that notification of conference calls was inconsistent; at times achieved by individual phone calls, and sometimes by email.

Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):

1. CCSF has the capability to communicate incident information between departments during the early stages of an oil spill event.
   a. **Recommendation:** None.
2. Future inter-department conference call notifications should be consistent.
   a. **Recommendation:** Develop a protocol for conference call notification, such as utilization of specific CCSF Alert notification groups.

**Observation 3.2: (Area for Improvement)** Some EOC personnel found it difficult to locate contact information for San Francisco department representatives involved in the event.

**Reference(s):**

**Analysis:** Overall, outgoing communications from the San Francisco EOC went well. Situation status updates were issued via CCSF Alert, and the Policy Group was updated at regular intervals. However, some EOC personnel found it difficult to locate contact information for specific individuals within a department.

**Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):**
1. EOC and Department Operation Center (DOC) contact information is located in the EOC Resource Directory and updated on a quarterly basis. Utilization of this directory should eliminate any difficulty in locating departmental contact information.
   a. **Recommendation:** Ensure that department contact information is correct in the EOC Resource Directory.
   b. **Recommendation:** When contact information within a department changes, ensure that the revised information is updated in the EOC Resource Directory.
   c. **Recommendation:** Departments with an EOC role should update their departmental contact information found in their Operations Support Section “Branch Bins” on a regular basis.
CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning

**Capability Summary:** The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

The term “public information” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official and includes both general information and crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) activities. CERC incorporates the urgency of disaster communication with risk communication to influence behavior and adherence to directives.

CCSF released public information in the form of a Mayor’s Press Conference and through social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter.

**Capability Definition Outcome:** Government agencies and public and private sectors receive and transmit coordinated, prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their health, safety, and property, through clear, consistent information-delivery systems. This information is updated regularly and outlines protective measures that can be taken by individuals and their communities.

**Activity 1: Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications**

**Observation 1.1: (Strength and Area for Improvement)** The CCSF Mayor’s Office conducted a press conference about the oil spill on October 30 at approximately 12:30 p.m., which was within four hours of initial notification. Use of social media to distribute spill information, however, was delayed.

Also early in the event, the DEM Public Information Officer (PIO) made contact with the Unified Command Joint Information Center (JIC). The DEM PIO continued to receive Unified Command press releases throughout the event.

**Reference(s):**
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Target Capabilities List (TCL). Critical Task: Res.B1f 5.2.5; Provide emergency information to the public that is verified, accurate, and as up-to-date as possible.

**Analysis:** CCSF was extremely efficient in coordinating and conducting a Mayor’s press conference at the early stages of the event. By disseminating event information from an official source at the beginning of the oil spill, CCSF was able to quickly inform the public of the most
current information, address public concerns, and dispel rumors. Furthermore, CCSF was also efficient in establishing early communication with the Unified Command JIC.

Due to the initial demands of the event, however, the issuance of information through social media was delayed. After activation of the EOC, information was posted on social media sites on a regular basis, and was seen as a useful public information tool. In future events, it would be beneficial to begin distributing public information on social media during the early stages.

Lessons Learned and Associated Recommendation(s):

1. Establishing contact with the Unified Command JIC early in the event was beneficial to the acquisition of public information.
   a. **Recommendation:** CCSF should continue to coordinate with the Unified Command JIC during oil spill events.

2. Conducting press conferences during the early stages of an event is very beneficial to the public perception of the event.
   a. **Recommendation:** CCSF should continue to coordinate press conferences during the early stages of an event.

3. Social media is an excellent way to distribute accurate public information on a regular basis. Although social media was well-utilized during the later stages of the event, it would have been advantageous to begin this effort sooner.
   a. **Recommendation:** When notified of an event that may have an effect on the population, ensure that social media outlets are updated in a timely manner with verified public information.
SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

The City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) responded well to the Dubai Star Oil Spill. It provided an excellent opportunity for departments to participate in a low-stress Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activation, and to assess plans, policies, and procedures pertaining to an oil spill event. CCSF departments demonstrated an exceptional ability to coordinate with one another in carrying out both field operations and EOC positions. The high level of commitment and inter-agency cooperation exhibited by involved departments is a result of the increased level of joint training, participation in planning meetings, and exercises conducted in the last few years.
APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This Improvement Plan (IP) has been developed specifically for the City and County of San Francisco as a result of Dubai Star Oil Spill response on October 30-31, 2009. These recommendations draw on the After Action Report (AAR).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Corrective Action Description</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING AND DISSEMINATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Observation 1.1:</strong> Early in the response, representatives from DEM and SFFD were sent to Coast Guard Island. The DEM representative was sent at the request of Unified Command representatives to fill the Unified Command Local Government On-Scene Coordinator (LGOSC) position. However, shortly after arriving and receiving a briefing, Unified Command requested that a representative from Alameda assume the LGOSC position. This transition was made, and the San Francisco representative was moved to the position of San Francisco Local Agency Representative in the Incident Command Post.</td>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 1:</strong> Selection of the LGOSC position must be a clearly defined process. Once established, the individual/county selected as LGOSC should maintain consistency throughout the operational period to avoid confusion.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> Through coordination with the region, ensure that the LGOSC position has clearly defined procedures, to include initial selection and transitioning of responsibilities.</td>
<td>DEM / CalEMA Coastal Region</td>
<td>Spring 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CCSF AFTER ACTION REPORT
Dubai Star Oil Spill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned 1:</th>
<th>Recommendation a: None</th>
<th>Corrective Action: None</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Observation 1.2:
The San Francisco EOC participated in frequent California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) Coastal Region conference calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned 2: More individuals within San Francisco must be familiarized with the roles and responsibilities of oil spill response positions in Unified Command and at the Incident Command Post.</th>
<th>Recommendation a: Provide training to numerous San Francisco departments to familiarize them with the roles and responsibilities associated with the LGOSC position and the San Francisco Local Agency Representative position.</th>
<th>Corrective Action: Provided overview of Agency Representative and LGOSC roles and responsibilities at OSPR Overview on January 7, 2010.</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency: DEM (in coordination with OSPR)</th>
<th>Completion Date: January 7, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation b: Provide the required LGOSC training, as defined in the San Francisco 2009 Area Contingency Plan, to multiple San Francisco representatives.</th>
<th>Corrective Action: Formal LGOSC training and depth to establish pool within DEM – may start with existing Duty Officer pool.</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency: DEM</th>
<th>Completion Date: 3 staff trained within 2010; ongoing training beyond completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Recommendation c: Develop a protocol for the Agency Representative position that outlines the roles and responsibilities of individuals assuming this position. | Corrective Action: Include the roles and responsibilities of the Agency Representative into the CCSF ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex, Part B: Marine Response. | Responsible Party/Agency: DEM | Completion Date: Spring 2010 |
### CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

#### Observation 1.1:
Upon notification that the waters Treasure Island / Yerba Buena Island and Piers 92 to 96 and 96 to Candlestick were potentially at risk of oil contamination, coordination to post "No Swimming" signs occurred instantaneously. The Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA), the Port of San Francisco, the Department of Public Works (DPW) and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) worked well together from October 30–November 2 to both post and remove "No Swimming" signs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Corrective Action 1</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 1:</strong>&lt;br&gt;It would be helpful to have a cache of beach, swimming, and/or fishing closure signage located on Treasure Island for easy access.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Stock Treasure Island with a cache of beach, swimming, and/or fishing closure signage.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action 1:</strong>&lt;br&gt;TIDA has now pre-staged signage on TI.</td>
<td>TIDA</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corrective Action 2:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Acquire additional beach, swimming, and/or fishing closure signage to place throughout the City. If possible, utilize standardize from OSPR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DEM/PUC to coordinate with OSPR, Port, and DPW</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Lesson Learned 2:**<br>The Port of San Francisco’s sign posting strategy from the 2007 Cosco Busan Oil Spill would have been helpful in the Dubai Star incident. | **Recommendation a:**<br>Plans and procedures developed during previous similar incidents should be captured and easily accessible for future use. | **Corrective Action:**<br>Port to include sign posting and removal strategy in their Emergency Operations Plan as an annex. | Port | December 2011 |
| **Recommendation b:** Ensure that departments/agencies who own beach, swimming, or fishing closure signs have a sign deployment plan. | **Corrective Action 1:**<br>Port to include sign posting and removal strategy in their Emergency Operations Plan as an annex. | | Port | December 2011 |
### CCSF AFTER ACTION REPORT
#### Dubai Star Oil Spill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Corrective Action Description</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corrective Action 2:</strong> Ensure that the CCSF ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex, Part B: Marine Response designates what signage should be posted during beach/fishery closure. Also designate who has authority to determine signage verbiage and placement.</td>
<td><strong>DEM</strong></td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 3:</strong> Although the EOC was deactivated, there must be sufficient follow-up on all remaining tasks and deactivation of resources, with a designated point of contact for each. Decisions made in the EOC about sign removal should have been documented and forwarded to applicable departments to ensure that this activity occurred.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> When the EOC is deactivated, ensure that all outstanding responsibilities have been assigned to an appropriate department, to include the deactivation of remaining resources.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action 1:</strong> Ensure that the demobilization unit captures and monitors follow-up actions to assign remaining responsibilities</td>
<td><strong>DEM</strong></td>
<td>Summer 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corrective Action 2:</strong> Capture within the CCSF ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex, Part B: Marine Response that PUC would be lead on water testing triggering removal of signage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DEM</strong></td>
<td>Summer 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Observation 1.2: The San Francisco EOC successfully coordinated the deployment and maintenance of 2,100 feet of Port-owned rigid boom at Clipper Cove.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Corrective Action</th>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 1:</strong> Information relayed from the ICP to the EOC must be verified for accuracy prior to release.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> Develop a protocol for the Agency Representative position that includes a procedure to verify information received at the ICP before distribution.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> Include Agency Representative position protocols in the CCSF ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex, Part B: Marine Response.</td>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Spring 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 2:</strong> Decisions regarding the safety and feasibility of a tactical operation are made by the appropriate departments/agencies based on department safety protocols.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> None.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 3:</strong> Pre-determined site booming options for non-ACP sites (such as economic sites) would be helpful in the event that San Francisco is interested in protecting areas that are not identified in the ACP.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> Develop site booming strategies for non-ACP sites in San Francisco.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> Port to coordinate development of non-ACP site booming strategies with a workgroup consisting of all relevant parties (TIDA, RPD, South Beach Harbor Redevelopment Agency, SFFD, SFPD).</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>December 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MANAGEMENT

**Observation 1.1:** The EOC was staffed quickly and with the appropriate department representatives to fill the following Emergency Support Functions (ESF):
- ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
- ESF #4: Firefighting
- ESF #5: Emergency Management
- ESF #7: Logistics
- ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
- ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
- ESF #13: Law Enforcement

**Lesson Learned 1:** San Francisco departments work very well together in an EOC setting, as a result of multiple training and exercise efforts over the past several years.

**Recommendation a:** Utilize future EOC activations as an opportunity for additional staff to shadow operations.

**Corrective Action:** Departments should utilize future EOC activations as training opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Departments</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observation 2.1:** Upon the determination that EOC activation was needed, activation details were relayed via CCSF Alert to relevant departments. However, not all departments received notification, while other departments received redundant notification among multiple employees. Some departments responded to the email notification with questions, but received no reply.

**Lesson Learned 1:** EOC activation information must be communicated to all relevant departments in a timely manner.

**Recommendation a:** Review CCSF Alert contacts and ensure that all relevant departments are included with correct contact information.

**Corrective Action:** DEM is currently working with DPCs to get updated contact information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Party/Agency</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CCSF AFTER ACTION REPORT

## Dubai Star Oil Spill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
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<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lesson Learned 2:  
Contact information for the notifying party should be clearly stated within the notification message to ensure that departments know who to contact with questions. | **Recommendation a:**  
When sending EOC activation notification or EOC situation status reports, ensure that appropriate contact information is included. | **Corrective Action 1:**  
Evaluate emphasizing key information on Sit Reps and templates with added contact information for Duty Officer. | DEM | Complete |
| | | **Corrective Action 2:**  
Evaluate automated response for those who reply to Situation Reports. | DEM | July 2010 |
| Lesson Learned 3:  
If not already established, departments should develop a designated EOC reporting procedure. | **Recommendation a:**  
Each department should consider developing a protocol that identifies staff members (three deep) required to report to the EOC upon initial activation. | **Corrective Action 1:**  
All departments should have internal protocols for EOC activation. | All Departments | Ongoing |
| | | **Corrective Action 2:**  
DEM is currently working with DPCs to get updated contact information (three-deep). | DEM | February 2010 |

**Observation 3.1:** The initial notification of the Dubai Star Oil Spill was received by the DEM Duty Officer at 8:12 a.m. The Duty Officer immediately submitted an initial situation briefing to San Francisco departments via CCSF Alert. At 10:00 a.m., DEM convened a conference call with appropriate departments to relay further information about the spill and its potential effects on San Francisco. Inter-department conference calls led by DEM continued throughout the response.

| Lesson Learned 1:  
CCSF has the capability to communicate incident information between departments during the early stages of an oil spill event. | **Recommendation a:**  
None. | **Corrective Action:**  
N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Lesson Learned 2:  
Future inter-department conference call notifications should be consistent. | **Recommendation a:**  
Develop a protocol for conference call notification, such as utilization of specific CCSF Alert notification groups. | **Corrective Action:**  
Set up CCSF Alert group specific for oil spills. | DEM | July 2010 |
## Lesson Learned 1:
EOC and Department Operation Center (DOC) contact information is located in the EOC Resource Directory and updated on a quarterly basis. Utilization of this directory should eliminate any difficulty in locating departmental contact information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observation 3.2: Some EOC personnel found it difficult to locate contact information for San Francisco department representatives involved in the event.</td>
<td>Recommendation a: Ensure that department contact information is correct in the EOC Resource Directory.</td>
<td>Corrective Action 1: DEM will exercise the existing list in the Resource Directory during GG10 and update as needed.</td>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corrective Action 2: Ensure DOC contact information is correct in the Resource Directory.</td>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendation b: When contact information within a department changes, ensure that the revised information is updated in the EOC Resource Directory.</td>
<td>Corrective Action: Assure that quarterly updates include this information through ERPW protocols.</td>
<td>DEM/GSA</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendation c: Departments with an EOC role should update their departmental contact information found in their Operations Support Section “Branch Bins” on a regular basis.</td>
<td>Corrective Action: Review and correct information in bins at a future DPC meeting.</td>
<td>DEM/DPCs</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CCSF AFTER ACTION REPORT
Dubai Star Oil Spill

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<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 1:</strong> Establishing contact with the Unified Command JIC early in the event was beneficial to the acquisition of public information.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> CCSF should continue to coordinate with the Unified Command JIC during oil spill events.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> None.</td>
<td>DEM PIO</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 2:</strong> Conducting press conferences during the early stages of an event is very beneficial to the public perception of the event.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> CCSF should continue to coordinate press conferences during the early stages of an event.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> None.</td>
<td>All Departments</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned 3:</strong> Social media is an excellent way to distribute accurate public information on a regular basis. Although social media was well-utilized during the later stages of the event, it would have been advantageous to begin this effort sooner.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation a:</strong> When notified of an event that may have an effect on the population, ensure that social media outlets are updated in a timely manner with verified public information.</td>
<td><strong>Corrective Action:</strong> Get information out to social media as soon as possible during an event.</td>
<td>All Departments</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observation 1.1:** The CCSF Mayor’s Office conducted a press conference about the oil spill on October 30 at approximately 12:30 p.m., which was within four hours of initial notification. Use of social media to distribute spill information, however, was delayed.
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# APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Area Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CalEMA</td>
<td>California Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSF</td>
<td>City and County of San Francisco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDFG</td>
<td>California Department of Fish and Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERC</td>
<td>Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Department of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Division of Emergency Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHR</td>
<td>Department of Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department Operation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPH</td>
<td>Department of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPW</td>
<td>Department of Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>General Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Incident Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGOSC</td>
<td>Local Government On-Scene Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWCN</td>
<td>Oiled Wildlife Care Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUC</td>
<td>Public Utilities Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>REOC</td>
<td>Regional Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFFD</td>
<td>San Francisco Fire Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFPD</td>
<td>San Francisco Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCL</td>
<td>Target Capabilities List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIDA</td>
<td>Treasure Island Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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</table>